State Tuition Tax Credits: A School Choice Policy Recommendation by Butler, Andrew M.
Running head: STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS                                                             1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Tuition Tax Credits: A School Choice Policy Recommendation 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Butler 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Senior Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for graduation 
in the Honors Program 
Liberty University 
Spring 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS  2 
Acceptance of Senior Honors Thesis 
 
This Senior Honors Thesis is accepted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for graduation from the 
Honors Program of Liberty University. 
 
 
      
 
 
______________________________ 
Gai Ferdon, Ph.D. 
Thesis Chair 
 
 
      
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Corey Martin, J.D. 
Committee Member 
 
 
      
 
______________________________ 
Russell Claxton, Ph.D. 
Committee Member 
 
 
          
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Marilyn Gadomski, Ph.D. 
Assistant Honors Director 
 
 
  
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Date 
  
 
 
 
 
STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS  3 
Abstract 
Public schools are afflicted by a litany of ailments ranging from the methodological to the 
practical. Public schools operate on a conflicted educational philosophy, are rife with 
inefficiencies, and result in educational monopolies. A state tuition tax credit system is 
the most advantageous policy option available in regards to education reform and school 
choice initiatives. This paper will examine some of the 11 state tuition tax credit 
programs currently in operation as well as other school choice options, and identify 
problems inherent in the public school system. State tuition tax credits are a superior 
educational policy option as compared with the public education system, because they 
allow free market pressures to reform inefficiencies in the public school system, and 
allow private schools an increased ability to compete. Other positive effects include 
increased parental choice, higher academic achievement, increased graduation rates, and 
decreased strains on state budgets. This paper will attempt to prove that state tuition tax 
credits are the most efficient and effective school choice policy in use today and should 
be adopted by the remaining 39 states. 
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State Tuition Tax Credits: A School Choice Policy Recommendation 
 School choice programs are proliferating at a rapid rate. The Wall Street Journal 
dubbed 2011 the “Year of School Choice,” as thirteen states passed major education 
reforms.1 State tuition tax credits are one of many school choice policy options available 
to states across America.  
Introduced in the late 1990s in the context of controversial voucher programs, 
state tuition tax credits were proposed as a popular education option consistent with state 
constitutional authority.2 Eleven states have since adopted some form of state tuition tax 
credit program.3 Despite variations in policy particulars, the basic function of the 
program allows individuals and corporations to take a portion of their state taxes and 
transfer them to nonprofit school tuition organizations (STOs). The STOs will directly 
issue scholarships to K-12 students. Some programs are means tested, some are capped at 
a certain dollar amount, and others exist to target specific socioeconomic groups. The 
unifying feature of state tuition tax credit programs is the tax credit; individuals or 
corporations receive a state income tax credit for donations made to approved charitable 
organizations, the vehicle through which assistance is provided for children to attend 
private schools.4 The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. Winn (2011), upheld Arizona’s state 
                                            
1
“The Year of School Choice,” The Wall Street Journal, July 5, 2011. 
  
2Nicole Stelle Garnett, “A Winn for Educational Pluralism,” 121 Yale Law Journal 
Online 31 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/05/26/garnett.html (accessed 3/4/2013) 
referencing Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman, 2002 Supreme Court Review 1, 15-18.  
  
3National Conference of State Legislatures, “Tuition Tax Credits,” 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/school-choice-scholarship-tax-credits.aspx (accessed 
3/4/2013). States include Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia. 
 
4Garnett, “A Winn for Educational Pluralism,” p. 31. Some programs, like the one in 
Arizona, allow both individuals and corporations to receive tax credit. 
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tuition tax credit system as constitutional. This paper will attempt to prove that state 
tuition tax credits are the most efficient and effective school choice policy in use today 
and should be adopted by the remaining 39 states.5 
Educational Philosophy 
State tuition tax credit policies demonstrate a clear advantage over other 
competing education options in that they recognize the nature of education as a religious 
enterprise. Noah Webster, widely considered to be the father of American education, 
defined education in his 1828 Dictionary of the English Language in the following 
manner:  
The bringing up, as of a child, instruction; formation of manners. 
Education comprehends all that series of instruction and discipline which 
is intended to enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form 
the manners and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in their future 
stations. To give children a good education in manners, arts and science, is 
important; to give them a religious education is indispensable; and an 
immense responsibility rests on parents and guardians who neglect these 
duties.6 
 
While education is typically reduced to a transmission of data and scientific facts about 
the world, Webster defines education as including instruction in truth, morality, ethics, 
manners, attitudes, habits, character and responsibility.  
Public schools, on the other hand, were originally instituted and designed to be a 
social force. Herbert Schlossberg argues this point, claiming that public schools were 
                                                                                                                                  
  
5Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 1 (2011).  
 
6Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1828, (West Valley 
City: Waking Lion Press, 2010) 246. 
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designed to solve problems of political, economic, social, and criminal derivation.7 
Moreover, education is inherently religious in nature. Even those who claim to educate 
from an anti-religious perspective elevate secularism as their religious philosophy. 
Learning cannot exist in an ideological vacuum, as presuppositions pervade all 
educational methodologies and philosophies. Education cannot be value-free, because 
any hierarchy of values is a religious system.8 Furthermore, Schlossberg argues that 
education is unique in that it operates in a framework of assumptions, not assertions. 
Assumptions bypass the critical faculty and function as powerful ideological tools for 
those who receive and integrate arguments without actively engaging the preceding 
assumption—a common phenomenon in many public school classrooms.9 
 This paper also assumes that civil government should be limited in its scope. As 
Justice Jackson articulated in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnett in 1943, “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”10 Justice 
Jackson establishes an important premise here: the government shall not establish or 
prescribe matters of opinion. When juxtaposed with the nature of education established 
above, these two premises cast light upon the issue of government involvement in 
education. While that question is ripe for analysis in another paper, this discussion will 
                                            
7Herbert Schlossberg, Idols of Destruction: The Conflict of Christian Faith and American 
Culture (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1990), 209. 
 
8Ibid., 210. 
 
9Ibid. 
  
10West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
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focus on state tuition tax credits as a policy option inclusive of the more fundamental 
assumption that civil authority is limited, and does not encompass liberty of conscience, 
the heart of education. 
Constitutionality: Arizona v. Winn 
A comprehensive evaluation of a policy must include a discussion of its 
constitutionality, a gateway consideration that ought to govern the conceptualization and 
implementation of all policy options. Furthermore, any policy’s ability to survive a 
challenge of constitutionality is central to its success. 
Arizona first passed its tuition tax credit program in 1997.11 It was designed to 
promote school choice at large, but proponents argued that it would prove to be of special 
value to children from low-income families who traditionally attend poor public 
schools.12 The policy has two tax credit schemes which cater to both individuals and 
corporations if they contribute to school tuition organizations (STOs). Dollar-for-dollar 
tax credits are available up to $500 for individuals, or up to $1,000 for joint filers. 
Arizona’s program does not establish a maximum tax credit ceiling for corporations—
they are allowed to contribute up to the equivalent of their entire corporate tax liability 
and receive it back in dollar-for-dollar tax credits. However, Arizona has capped total tax 
credits offered, distributing up to $17.28 million to corporations on a first-come, first 
serve basis.13 Four Arizona residents recently challenged the constitutionality of the state 
                                            
11Ronald J. Hansen, “High Court Upholds Arizona’s Tuition Tax-Credit Program,” The 
Arizona Republic, April 5, 2011. See A.R.S. 43-1089 (for individuals) and A.R.S. 43-1183 (for 
corporations). 
  
12Ibid. 
  
13The $17.28 million cap is from FY 2010. The cap will increase 20% annually. A 
concise description of both individual and corporate provisions in the Arizona program can be 
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tuition tax credit system and the Supreme Court heard the case in Arizona Christian 
School Tuition Organization v. Winn.14 
At issue in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Kathleen M. Winn, 
et al. was Article III standing, which the Court held taxpayers in Arizona lacked under 
Flast v. Cohen (1968).15 The majority opinion,16 written by Justice Kennedy, held that the 
only taxpayers with standing under Flast are those contesting direct monetary outlays on 
First Amendment Establishment Cause grounds. The majority held that Flast does not 
extend standing to Arizona’s taxpayers objecting to tax credit provisions such as provided 
in Arizona’s tuition tax credit scheme, which awarded tax credits to individuals and 
corporations for contributions made to STOs.17 The majority concluded that:  
This Court has rejected the general proposition that an individual who has 
paid taxes has a “continuing, legally cognizable interest in ensuring that 
those funds are not used by the Government in a way that violates 
the Constitution.”18 
 
                                                                                                                                  
found at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/school-choice-scholarship-tax-credits.aspx 
(accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
14Arizona v. Winn, 563 U.S. 1 (2011). 
 
15Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Florance Flast joined several others in suit against 
Wilbur Cohen, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. The suit argued that spending 
government funds on religious schools violated the First Amendment’s opposition to the 
establishment of religion. In Flast, in order to determine standing, the court articulated a two 
pronged test. First, the taxpayer must be the proper party to challenge the constitutionality of the 
tax. Second, the taxpayer must “show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific 
constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power and not simply that 
the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. 1, § 8.” at 102-103. 
 
16Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas all joined in Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion. Justice Scalia also wrote a brief concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined. 
 
17See Arizona Revised Statute Annotated § 43-1089 (2011), available at 
http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/43/01089.html (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
18Arizona v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 at 1442-1443. Quoting Hein v. Freedom From 
Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587. 
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On the other hand, Justice Kagan argued in her dissent that Flast affords standing to 
Arizona taxpayers, grounding her assertion in the academic doctrine of “tax expenditure 
analysis,” and concluding that “targeted tax breaks…are just spending under a different 
name.”19 
Tax Expenditure Analysis 
The tax expenditure analysis relied upon by Justice Kagan in her dissent is weak 
for three reasons. First, tools of constitutional analysis “must be reasonable, coherent and 
principled” in their guidance to the courts, and tax expenditure analysis does not pass this 
test. Second, “the quandaries of defining tax expenditures arise not simply at the margins, 
but rather at the very core of the concept.” 20 Because the concept’s definition is largely 
nebulous, it would be unwise to create an exception allowing for tax expenditure analysis 
to be used here. Third, the conclusions drawn by Justice Kagan made on the basis of this 
analysis violate the nature of private property by enlarging the state’s ability to count all 
income as government property, or monies. 
Concerning the difference between expenditures and tax breaks that tax 
expenditure analysis attempts to negate, the Court had to determine whether or not direct 
government spending and tax subsidies were the same. The question of equivalency, 
particularly in regards to direct public outlays and tax subsidies for constitutional 
                                            
19Edward A. Zelinsky, “Winn and the Inadvisibility of Constitutionalizing Tax 
Expenditure Analysis,” 121. Yale Law Journal Online 25 (2011), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/05/26/zelinsky.html (accessed 3/4/2013). Winn, 131 S. Ct. at 1452; 
1456 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor in her dissent. 
 
20Ibid., 28. 
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purposes, is something the Court is well versed in confronting.21 “However, Justice 
Kagan’s dissent in Winn is only the second time that tax expenditure doctrine has 
formally played such an explicit, prominent role in the Court’s decision making.” 
According to Edward A. Zelinsky, tax expenditure analysis has two key provisions: 
“…(1) that tax deductions, credits, exemptions and exclusions can be divided into 
‘normative’ tax provisions necessary to implement the tax and ‘expenditure’ provisions 
which deviate from the normative tax, and (2) that such tax expenditures are equivalent to 
direct monetary outlays.” Tax expenditure analysis has been enormously successful in 
terms of legal scholarship and legal education, and yet some of its core flaws have never 
been resolved. Zelinsky points out that tax expenditure analysis provides no bright-line 
standard or principle by which one can classify tax provisions as normative or otherwise, 
and thus the distinction between normative provisions necessary for the implementation 
of the tax and special provisions treated as expenditures is only a pipedream.22  
Justice Kagan contends that “[C]ash grants and targeted tax breaks are a means of 
accomplishing the same government objective—to provide financial support to select 
individuals or organizations.”23 Though this assumption may be true, she employs it to 
prove that Arizona taxpayers have standing. 
                                            
21Ibid., 26. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, “Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally 
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?” 112 Harvard Law Review 379 (1998) He discusses four 
cases from the mid-1990s, where the Court confronted the question of whether tax benefits are 
direct expenditures. 
 
22Ibid. For a seminal discussion of tax expenditure analysis, see Stanley S Surrey, “Tax 
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct 
Government Expenditures,” 83 Harvard Law Review 705, 711 (1970). Stanley Surrey is credited 
with the creation of tax expenditure analysis in 1967 when he was Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury for Tax Policy. 
 
23Arizona v. Winn, 23. 
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Taxpayers who oppose state aid of religion have equal reason to protest 
whether that aid flows from the one form of subsidy or the other. Either 
way, the government has financed the religious activity. And so either 
way, taxpayers should be able to challenge the subsidy.24 
 
If Justice Kagan is correct, then it must also be true that the state has a more basic and 
fundamental claim to an individual’s property than the individual does, justifying broader 
state claims to private property. The Constitution, on the other hand, assumes individuals 
have a more basic and fundamental right to property than the state, via the Fourth 
Amendment. Thus, Justice Kagan’s application of tax expenditure analysis is imprudent 
at best. 
Religious Neutrality 
Quoting Flast in her dissent, Justice Kagan harkens back to the basis of the 
Establishment Clause: “[O]ne of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the 
Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power 
would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general.”25 In 
essence, Justice Kagan is asserting that tuition tax credits, which “come out of what 
[citizens] otherwise would be legally obligated to pay the state,”26 will favor one religion 
over another or support religion in general because to fund education participants will 
divert their money to religious or parochial schools. Given the nature of tuition tax 
credits, Kagan’s argument breaks down. Placing choice in the hands of individuals, 
especially parents, as opposed to the state, does not result in state sponsorship of religion, 
but instead, prevents it. This is true for two reasons. First, if individuals are allowed to 
                                            
24Arizona v. Winn, 2.  
  
25
 Ibid., 39. 
 
26
 Ibid., 36. 
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choose where their children are educated with their own money, the state is not 
sponsoring religion in any way—the individual is—and the First Amendment explicitly 
protects the individual’s liberty of conscience relative to religious matters, which cannot 
be separated from education. Justice Kennedy references this logic in his majority 
opinion:  
When the government declines to impose a tax…there is no such connection 
between dissenting taxpayer and alleged establishment. Any financial injury 
remains speculative…. And awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other 
citizens to retain control over their funds in accordance with their own 
consciences.27 
 
Second, Kagan’s argument assumes that all property belongs to the state. However, if it is 
true that personal property belongs to the individual, then property retained by the 
individual and spent by the individual for his own purposes is not a state sponsorship of 
religion or any other activity or philosophy. Untaxed money never enters the state 
treasuries, and thus, there is no state establishment of religion, and consequently no 
violation of the First Amendment. Kagan’s argument lacks constitutional weight. 
Parental Choice 
Given the inseparable relationship between education and worldview, parental 
choice in education becomes paramount. If the government is given control over 
education funding, it then wields an educational monopoly. On the other hand, if parents 
can choose where their children attend school with their own funds, they can preserve 
their right to raise and educate their children. Tuition tax credits broaden the educational 
choice of parents and other interested participants by providing them with a tax credit to 
sponsor a child in a participating private school. Thus, the close relationship between 
                                            
27Winn, 14. 
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parenting, education and religion is respected, as power is retained by those who have the 
greatest interest in children—the parents. 
Academic Achievement vs. National Standards 
 State policymakers have an option: either they will comply with Washington’s 
call for national curricula or they will retain control over their own state’s educational 
achievement standards, and design, tailor, and implement them in ways which reflect the 
standards of parents and members of the community. A state tuition tax credit system 
would contribute to the latter by creating educational opportunities through private 
investments. 
 The Common Core State Standards Initiative (CCSSI) is the most recent push by 
the federal government to increase the Department of Education’s (DE) role in 
education.28 Following in the national policy context of No Child Left Behind (NCLB),29 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),30 and Race to the Top (RTT)31 
programs, CCSSI is intended to incentivize state governments to align their educational 
                                            
28CCSSI was an outcome of the Obama Administration’s joint program with the National 
Governor’s Association (NGA) and Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO). Further 
coverage of CCSSI can be found in Sandra Stotsky, “Common Core Standards’ Devastating 
Impact on Literary Study and Analytical Thinking,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3800, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/12/questionable-quality-of-the-common-core-
english-language-arts-standards (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
29NCLB was passed in the first George W. Bush Administration. Pub.L. 107-110, enacted 
January 8, 2002. 
 
30ARRA was passed in the first Obama Administration. Pub.L. 111-5, enacted February 
17, 2009.   
 
31The $4.35 billion in the RTT fund is provided for in the ARRA. 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013). 
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standards with national ones.32 Nevertheless, such programs are ineffective in increasing 
academic achievement, and states should be cautious to create such a relationship for 
three reasons. 
 First, the Constitution denies the federal government authority over educational 
matters, and the enumeration of Congress’s powers in Article 1 Section 8 reflects this 
prohibition. Second, experts agree that national standards lack requisite academic rigor. 
Former U.S. Department of Education official and mathematician Ze’ev Wurman finds 
the Common Core standards particularly deficient. 
[T]he Common Core mathematics standards fail on clarity and rigor 
compared to better state standards and to those of high achieving 
countries. They do not expect algebra to be taught in grade 8 and … their 
promise of college readiness rings hollow. Its college-readiness standards 
are below the admission requirement of most four-year state colleges.33 
 
Second, Sandra Stotsky, a University of Arkansas professor and member of the 
Common Core standards validation committee for English Language Arts, finds that 
national standards are defective methodologically. CCSSI was designed by “[the] same 
special interests that gave us the poor states’ standards they were designed to replace.”34 
Third, the Brookings Institute forecasts that proposed national standards will have 
“little to no impact on student learning” due to the fact that in-state performance variation 
is so high: 
                                            
32Stotsky, “Common Core Standards’ Devastating Impact on Literary Study and 
Analytical Thinking.” 
  
33
 Ze’ev Wurman and W. Stephen Wilson, “The Common Core Math Standards,” 
Education Next, vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer 2012), http://educationnext.org/the-common-core-math-
standards/ (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
34
 Sandra Stotsky, “How to Avoid Dumbing High Schools Down in Reauthorizing 
ESEA,” Jay P. Greene’s blog, February 22, 2011, http://jaypgreene.com/tag/sandra-stotsky/ 
(accessed 3/4/2013). 
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Consider Massachusetts and Mississippi, a state [sic] with low scores but 
not at the very bottom. Their NAEP [National Assessment of Educational 
Progress] means differ by 25 points. Every state, including Massachusetts 
and Mississippi, has a mini-Massachusetts and Mississippi contrast within 
its own borders. That variation will go untouched by common state 
standards…. The empirical evidence suggests that the Common Core will 
have little effect on American students’ achievement. The nation will have 
to look elsewhere for ways to improve its schools.35 
 
Academic Achievement 
 Coupled with parental rights and property rights, academic achievement is one of 
the most important elements by which a state tuition tax credit system can be judged. 
Parents who send their children to independent schools consistently indicate that 
academic quality is their primary concern.36 Furthermore, this priority is not confined to 
educational districts known for high academic achievement or high income. A report 
presented by John J. Convey at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational 
Research Association found that the majority of the 11,000 Catholic-school parents in 
Washington, D.C. cited the “academic program” as their most important reason for 
choosing a Catholic school.37 State tuition tax credits increase independent school options 
for many families, and if independent schools produce higher academic achievement, 
                                            
35
 Tom Loveless, “How Well Are American Students Learning?” Brookings Institution 
2012 Brown Center Report on American Education, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 2012), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2012/0216_brown_education_loveless/0216_
brown_education_loveless.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
36See Edith McArthur, Kelly W. Colopy, and Beth Schlaline, “Use of School Choice 
Educational Policy Issues, Statistical Perspectives [Revised],” National Center for Education 
Statistics, 1995; ERIC document no. ED387859. 
 
37John J. Convey, “Parental Choice of Catholic Schools as a Function of Religion, Race, 
and Family Income,” Research report presented at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA, April 16-20 1986, 5; ERIC document no. 
ED269542. 
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then state tuition tax credits are the best policy option that will correspondingly increase 
academic achievement. 
 James Coleman, a sociologist, empirical researcher, and president of the 
American Sociological Association, completed studies in the late 1980s which indicated 
that student achievement in Catholic high schools, when controlled for the influence of 
family background, is equivalent to approximately one grade increase as compared to 
public schools. Public school students showed two years of growth in four years of 
schooling, while Catholic students demonstrated nearly three years of learning in the 
same amount of time.38 The studies of Anthony Bryk, one of America’s most noted 
educational researchers and ninth president of the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching, indicate discrete differences in mathematics performance 
between Catholic and public schools. The advantage offered by Catholic schools is 
equivalent to 3.2 years of additional learning over the course of a high school education, 
after accounting for family background, social class, and race/ethnicity.39 The National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports that in 2011, 8th graders in private schools 
outscored their public school counterparts by 13 points in mathematics, 15 points in 
science, 15 points in writing, and 18 points in reading.40 The difference in achievement 
                                            
38J. S. Coleman, & T. Hoffer, Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of 
Communities, (New York: Basic Books, 1987). 
 
39Anthony S. Bryk, Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland, Catholic Schools and the 
Common Good, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 262-263. Measurements 
concerning student achievement relative to mathematics are particularly relevant because 
mathematics has been found to be the subject least affected by home-related factors and most 
influenced by classroom instruction. 
 
40National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Report, 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/private_school_quick_data.asp (accessed 3/4/2013). 
The most recent science scores available are from 2009. Scores were out of 500 points in 
mathematics and reading and 300 points in writing and science. 
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between public and private schools is stark, and state tuition tax credits are likely to 
improve academic achievement among students who are able to attend private schools. 
Academic Attainment 
 Dr. Patrick J. Wolf, who holds an Endowed Chair in School Choice Education 
Reform, conducted an evaluation of the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) 
that is particularly relevant to the issue of academic attainment. The OSP found that 82% 
of students offered scholarships to private schools graduated, while 70% of students 
denied such scholarships graduated, resulting in a 12% higher graduation rate among the 
former group.41 Those who benefited from the scholarships, evidenced a 21% increase in 
graduation rates in comparison to whose who did not. With this, 91% of students who 
received a scholarship in the Washington, D.C. OSP graduated from high school. The 
survey divided participants into two statistically similar groups. The treatment group was 
offered scholarships, while the control group was not.42 The treatment group numbered 
1,387 students, all of which were offered scholarships, while 921 students were in the 
control group and were not offered scholarships.43 
The results of Dr. Wolfe’s study are considered reliable as The Heritage 
Foundation regarded its methodology as a “gold standard” for reliability.44 Lindsey 
                                            
41Lindsey Burke, “Study: DC Opportunity Scholarship Program Benefits Participants,” 
The Heartland Institute, June 25, 2010, 
http://www.heartland.org/full/27877/Study_DC_Opportunity_Scholarship_Program_Benefits_Pa
rticipants.html (accessed 3/4/2013). 
  
42Ibid. 
 
43Ibid. 
 
44Lidsey M. Burke and Rachel Sheffield, “School Choice in America 2011: Educational 
Opportunities Reaches New Heights”. Heritage Backgrounder No. 2597. 
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Burke, a Will Skillman Fellow in Education at The Heritage Foundation quoted from Dr. 
Patrick Wolf on the importance of academic attainment: “…high school graduation is the 
‘Holy Grail of educational interventions in the inner city.’ Moreover, Wolf notes that 
high school graduates live longer, earn higher wages, experience lower rates of 
unemployment, and are less likely to be convicted of a crime. ‘If a program boosts the 
graduation rate, and does nothing else, it’s a success.’”45 Varied school choice programs 
of many forms have reliably and consistently produced increased graduation rates, and 
state tuition tax credits promise to produce similar results. 
 The evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) was similar 
to Dr. Wolf’s evaluation. John F. Witte led a team of researchers whose survey tracked 
MPCP 9th graders and compared them to a carefully matched sample of 9th graders 
enrolled in the Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS).46 MPCP students were found to have 
slightly higher rates of academic attainment given that more MPCP than MPS students 
graduated from high school, and went onto and enroll in a four-year college. Witte’s 
group of researchers also identified numerous other studies that support the value of high 
school graduation. The Milwaukee report’s meta-evaluation indicated that increased 
academic attainment results in regular employment, aversion to criminal and other 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/school-choice-in-america-2011-educational-
opportunity-reaches-new-heights#_ftnref123 (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
45Burke, “Study: DC Opportunity Scholarship Program Benefits Participants.” 
 
46Joshua M. Cowen, David J. Fleming, John F. Witte, and Patrick J. Wolf, “Student 
Attainment and the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,” March 2011, 
http://www.uark.edu/ua/der/SCDP/Milwaukee_Eval/Report_24.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013). 
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dysfunctional behavior, and increased personal income and savings.47 Furthermore, the 
same meta-evaluation found that the attainment of a high school degree positively affects 
life expectancy, overall health and health care, wealth accumulation, increased tax 
revenues and economic development. 
Competition in Education 
 Two important studies deserve consideration here relative to competition. First is 
a study focused on The McKay Scholarship program in Florida, which indicated that 
disabled students in the public school system benefited because of competition with a 
voucher program. 48 The authors of the report state that “rather than being harmed, public 
                                            
47Ibid. 2. See also Ellen Meara, Seth Richards, and David Cutler, “The Gap Gets Bigger: 
Changes in Mortality and Life Expectancy, By Education, 1981-2000,” 2008, Health Affairs, vol. 
27, no 2; John S. Wirt, Susan P. Choy, Patrick Rooney, Stephen Provasnik, Anindita Sen and 
Richard Tobin, “The Condition of Education” (NCES 2004-077); U.S. Department of Education, 
National Center for Education Statistics; Washington D.C. Peter Muenning, “The economic value 
of health gains associated with education interventions,” Manuscript prepared for the Equity 
Symposium on The Social Costs of Inadequate Education at Teachers’ College, Columbia 
University; Cecilia E. Rouse, “Labor market consequences of an inadequate education,” paper 
prepared for the symposium on the Social Costs of Inadequate Education, Teachers’ College, 
Columbia University; Cecilia E. Rouse, “Labor market consequences of an inadequate 
education”; Pedro Carneiro, James J. Heckman, and Edward Vytlacil, “Understanding What 
Instrumental Variables Estimate: Estimating Marginal and Average Returns to Education” 
University of Chicago working paper; Jennifer Day and Eric Newburger, “The Big Payoff: 
Educational Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings” US Census Bureau, 
Washington D.C.; Clive Belfield and Henry Levin, “The Return on Investment for Improving 
California’s High School Graduation Rate,” California Dropout Research Project, Santa Barbara, 
California; Adriana Lleras-Muney, “The Relationship Between Education and Adult Morality in 
the United States” The Review of Economic Studies, 72: 250; Clive Belfield and Henry Levin, 
“High School Dropouts and the Economic Loses from Juvenile Crime in California,” California 
Dropout Research Project. Santa Barbara, California. 
 
48
 Jay P. Greene and Marcus A. Winters, “The Effect of Special Education Vouchers on 
Public School Achievement: Evidence From Florida's McKay Scholarship Program,” Manhattan 
Institute Civic Report No. 52, April 2008, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_52.html 
(accessed 3/4/2013). 
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schools respond to the challenge of exposure to school choice by improving the education 
they provide.”49  
The second study consisted of a large compilation of studies collected by Greg 
Forster, and from which he argues that private school choice inserts an element of 
accountability into the educational formula, which uniquely predisposes public schools to 
augment their academic performance given the parental option of choosing a competitive 
private school if the public option is deemed unsatisfactory.50 Forster references nineteen 
studies in support of this argument. Seventeen found that public schools improved in the 
context of a voucher system, and one report demonstrated public school improvement 
when competing with a tax credit scholarship program. Only one study found no visible 
impact on public schools.51 Without private school choice options, the educational system 
is insulated from market forces and disincentivized from achieving higher academic 
performance. Nevertheless competition demonstrates that public schools can improve. 
 Additionally, public education transportation expenses have been steadily rising 
over the past fifty years. According to statistics compiled by Andrew J. Coulson, from 
1949-50 the annual cost of transportation was $184 per student, rising to $285 in 1977-
78, and peaking at $420 in 1990-91.52 If public schools were able to increase efficiency 
and decrease transportation costs to that of the late 1970s, taxpayers would save 
                                            
49Ibid. 
 
50
 Greg Forster, "A Win-Win Solution: The Empirical Evidence on How Vouchers Affect 
Public Schools," School Choice Issues in Depth, January 2009, 
http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/downloadFile.do?id=357. 
 
51Ibid. 
 
52Andrew J. Coulson, Market Education: The Unknown History, (Transaction Publishers: 
Social Philosophy and Policy Center, 1999), 207. 
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approximately $2.5 billion dollars annually. The market signals created by a state tuition 
tax credit system would help reach such goals. 
Education Competition vs. Unions 
Teacher unions are a component of public education, the negative effects of 
which can be alleviated by a state tuition tax credit system. In a recently published issue 
brief, James Sherk of The Heritage Foundation puts forth five reasons why unions 
suffocate state budgets and frustrate government employees.53 First, unions inflate costs 
for state governments by diverting money from other budgeting needs to wage 
increases,54 including pensions, which have skyrocketed in states with collective 
bargaining. States currently face between $1 billion and $4 billion in unfunded pension 
liabilities,55 resulting in the crowding out of other important government priorities.56 
Sherk notes that increased pension costs have forced San Bernadino and Vallejo, 
                                            
53James Sherk, “Voluntary Union Representation,” The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief 
no. 3813, January 3 2013, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/ib3813.pdf (accessed 
3/4/2013). 
 
54Ibid., citing Jeffrey Zax and Casey Ichniowski, The Effects of Public Sector Unionism 
on Pay, Employment, Department Budgets, and Municipal Expenditures (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 323–364, http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7915.pdf (accessed 3/4/2013). 
While overall budget costs do not always increase, this study found that expenses are diverted 
from other valuable areas in the context of collective bargaining. 
 
55Ibid., citing The Pew Center on the States, “The Widening Gap Update,” Issue Brief, 
June 2012, http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Pensions_Update.pdf 
(accessed 3/4/2013); see also Andrew G. Biggs, “Public Sector Pensions: How Well Funded Are 
They, Really?” State Budget Solutions, July 2012, 
http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/doclib/20120716_PensionFinancingUpdate.pdf (accessed 
January 24, 2013); see also Sarah F. Anzia and Terry M. Moe, “Public Sector Unions and the 
Costs of Government,” American Political Science Association 2012 Annual Meeting Paper, 
August, 2012, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107862, finding that a 10% increase in union 
membership resulted in $1,400 increased state pension liability per-capita.  
 
56Ibid., citing Governor Pat Quinn (D–IL), who highlighted this result with a Web video 
featuring an animated snake called “Squeezy the Pension Python,” available online at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H62W9iLfKv4&feature=plcp (accessed January 24, 2013).  
STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS  22 
California, to declare bankruptcy, and induced Illinois to increase its state income tax by 
two-thirds from just under $5 billion to $7 billion.57 Second, most unions permit union 
officials to perform union duties while clocked in at their government jobs. Taxes pay for 
union operations, freeing them to divert their funds to political activism.58 Third, unions 
deduct dues directly from employee paychecks, a practice which results in disguised, 
coerced fundraising for causes typically unsupported by these same employees.59 Fourth, 
the vast majority of union officials represent a workforce that did not consent to, or 
approve of, their leadership. Given these realities unions have little to no incentive to 
represent their members effectively and honestly, and members have little ability to hold 
their union officials accountable. Fifth, one-size-fits-all contracts are forced on all, which 
disregards the differentiation of collective bargaining preferences among union 
members.60  
                                            
57Ibid., citing Monique Garcia, “Record Tax Hike Isn’t Fixing Illinois’ Problems,” The 
Chicago Tribune, May 28, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-05-28/news/ct-met-
illinois-budget-20120528_1_pension-payments-income-tax-tax-hike (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
58Ibid. See Mallory Factor, Shadowbosses: Government Unions Control America and 
Rob Taxpayers Blind (New York: Center Street Hachette Book Group, 2012), 19. She finds that 
government employees work on union business while receiving taxpayer dollars for 23 million 
hours a year resulting in an aggregate loss of $1 billion in government labor. 
 
59See Andrew J. Coulson, The Effects of Teachers Unions on American Education, Cato 
Journal, vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 155. “Of the National Education Association’s $30 million 
in federal campaign contributions since 1990, 93 percent has gone to Democrats or the 
Democratic Party. Of the $26 million in federal campaign contributions by the American 
Federation of Teachers, 99 percent has gone to Democrats or the Democratic Party…” “In fact, if 
the NEA and AFT are taken together (not unreasonable, given that they overwhelmingly support 
the same party and pursue a similar agenda), they constitute the most generous source of federal 
political donations over the past 20 years. According to a ranking by the Center for Responsive 
Politics (2009), the NEA and AFT together have spent $56 million on federal political 
contributions since1989, roughly as much as Chevron, Exxon Mobil, the NRA, and Lockheed 
Martin combined.” Citing Center for Responsive Politics “National Education Assn: Summary,” 
www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000064 (accessed 3/4/2013). 
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Due to the positive effect that state tuition tax credits have on school choice, 
public school union membership would decrease if it were voluntary. Budgets would be 
affected positively and governments would be able to enhance labor efficiency. 
Furthermore, wages will be tailored more closely to market pressures, benefitting both 
educators and students.  
Overall Cost and Benefit 
Taxpayer dollars expended on public schooling have risen astronomically over the 
last century. Andrew J. Coulson masterfully unravels education spending growth in 
Market Education: The Unknown History. Coulson cites NCES figures which indicate 
that national government was spending slightly more than $500 per pupil in average daily 
attendance in the 1920s, with a spending increase of $7,000 per pupil in average daily 
attendance in the late 1990s.61 This amounts to a government expenditure of fourteen 
times more per pupil for public education at the end of the twentieth century. According 
to Coulson, explanations for the spending growth fall into two categories: first, some 
argue for the necessity of increased spending based on the nature and value of school 
programs, and second, some dispute the spending growth itself.62 Both of these 
explanations are lacking in substance.  
                                                                                                                                  
60If one member prefers a higher salary to increased benefits, while another prefers a 
better pension to performance-based raises, neither can make such requests known as per the 
generic member contracts. 
 
61Coulson, Market Education, 202. 
 
62Ibid., 202. 
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Some increases in spending have been attributed to building and maintenance. 
Nevertheless: capital outlays fell from 14.8% in 1919-20 to 9.3% in 1992-93.63 Others 
speculate that inflation should be calculated differently for education than for other 
industries. This theory’s main proponents, Richard Rothstein and Karen Miles, argue that 
because education is labor-intensive and because labor costs can rise faster than the 
average rate of inflation, education spending should be compared to other labor-intensive 
industries.64 Rothstein and Miles modified the special inflation index for the service 
sector as provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, but the difference between the two 
indices amounts to only 0.2% in actual spending growth between 1982 and 1991. The 
new index explains less than 2% of the growth in public school spending.65 Furthermore, 
Coulson concludes that public school spending growth may be even higher than indicated 
above. If the CPI overstates inflation to be between 0.5% and 1.5% annually, a position 
taken by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 
public school spending growth could be understated by as much as one-and-a-half to 
three times.66 Given this, public education spending might have grown twenty-one to 
forty-two times since 1919-20.67  
                                            
63See NCES, Digest, 1995, 154. 
 
64Coulson, Market Education, 205. 
 
65Ibid. 
 
66Ibid. 
 
67Ibid. This conclusion assumes the CPI error to be a constant over the entire period in 
question. Coulson concludes: “It is safe to say, however, that there is considerable evidence 
indicating that the CPI figures understate the historical growth in real education spending.” 
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Teacher salary increases are an additional explanation for spending growth. 
Inflation-adjusted teacher salaries have increased by approximately one-and-a-half times 
between 1949-50 and 1989-90.68 Growth in public education staffing has also increased 
exponentially relative to student enrollment. The Heritage Foundation cites NCES 
statistics that show student enrollment has increased 8% since the 1970s, while teaching 
staff has increased 60%, and non-teaching staff, 138%.69 This report finds that more 
teachers are instructing fewer students now than at any point in American history, with 
no data indicating that student achievement increased as a result.  
An additional metric to consider relative to school spending is the number of 
teachers as a percentage of school staff. Since 2000, this percentage has declined by 
nearly 3%, 16.5% since 1970, and 28% since 1950.70 The administrative bloat created by 
a bureaucracy of administrators in the public school system cannot be overstated, nor can 
it be justified given that student performance has not increased proportionally. 
The state tuition tax credit program instituted in Arizona in 1997 has resulted in 
decreased education costs on the part of the state, and increased benefits. In sixteen years 
scholarships totaling $501 million have been dispensed through the program.71 A report 
published by the Goldwater Institute in 2003 found that in its first year of operation, 
                                            
68Ibid., 206. Increases in teacher salaries went from $19,000 per year to $38,000 per year. 
 
69Lindsey Burke, “How Education Spending is Killing Crucial Reforms,” Heritage 
Backgrounder #2739. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/how-escalating-
education-spending-is-killing-crucial-reform (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
70Ibid. 
  
71Private School Tuition Organization Income Tax Credits in Arizona: A Summary of 
Activity, 3. 
http://www.azdor.gov/Portals/0/Reports/FY2012%20private%20schl%20tuition%20org%20crdt
%20rept.pdf. Accessed 3/4/2013 (accessed 3/4/2013). 
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4,248 donors received the scholarship tax credit, and after four years, participation rose to 
50,000 individual donors.72 Reports published by the Arizona Department of Revenue 
indicate that growth has continued to the present day; in 2012, 76,751 individuals 
contributed to the state tuition tax credit program. Furthermore, 90.8% of the scholarships 
dispensed have come from individual contributions, indicating an extremely high 
participation rate and corresponding high interest among individual families.73 The 
Goldwater Institute report supports this conclusion: “The amount of participation 
demonstrates a high level of awareness of and commitment to the program among 
taxpayers. It is particularly notable given the economic downturn in 2001.”74 While 
students who attend private schools and utilize the scholarship tax credit are technically a 
loss on the state budget, state and localities in Arizona saved $4,715 per child who 
switched to private education.75 
Nationwide public education spending has increased exponentially since its 
inception. The public education system lacks incentives to increase education efficiency 
and academic performance, and is insulated from market forces. A state tuition tax credit 
system would remedy these expenditure and performance issues and provide needed 
assistance to already stretched state and federal budgets. 
                                            
72Carrie Lips Lukas, “The Arizona Tax Credit: Providing Choice for Arizona Taxpayers 
and Students,” Goldwater Institute Policy Report no. 186 December 11, 2003, 3. 
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/19178.pdf. Accessed 
3/4/2013 (accessed 3/4/2013). 
 
73
 Private School Tuition Organization Income Tax Credits in Arizona: A Summary of 
Activity, 3.  
 
74Lukas, “The Arizona Tax Credit,” 6.  
  
75Ibid., 13. 
  
STATE TUITION TAX CREDITS  27 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE TUITION TAX CREDIT PROGRAMS 
  Critics of state tuition tax credit programs attempt to leverage many arguments 
against the free market’s effect on education. There are three mainstream arguments 
against school choice policy options at large and state tuition tax credits in particular.  
The first is the claim that poor parents from the inner cities of America are 
incapable of making beneficial educational decisions for their children. In Market 
Education, Coulson cites two important studies which counter this criticism. The first 
indicates that poor and wealthy Catholic-school parents in Washington, D.C. rank 
“academic program” as the key reason for choosing independent schools.76 The second, 
broader study demonstrates that the poorest families were more likely to rate academics 
as “very important” when compared to the wealthiest families.77 If poor families in the 
inner-cities of America were given the opportunity to send their children to the school of 
their choice, they would tend to choose schools with high academic standards.78 While 
state tuition tax credits assist parents of all economic strata, those who would benefit 
from the program more are low-income families. Tax credits can and often do make the 
difference between choosing a private school over a public school. Furthermore, the state 
                                            
76Coulson, Market Education, 261. See John J. Convey, “Parental Choice of Catholic 
Schools as a Function of Religion, Race and Family Income,” Research report presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, CA, April 
16-20 1986, 5; ERIC document no. ED269542.  
 
77Ibid. See Patricia A. Bauch, “Can Poor Parents Make Wise Educational Choices?” in 
William Lowe Boyd and James G. Cibulka, eds., Private Schools and the Public Good (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 298. See also Virgil C. Blum, “Why Inner-
City Families Send Their Children to Private Schools: An Empirical Study,” in Edward M. 
Gaffney, Jr., ed., Private Schools and the Public Good (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981), 19. Blum says that the willingness of parents in chaotic and violent urban 
environments to pursue more disciplined independent schools is not surprising. 
 
78Ibid. 
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tuition tax credit program implemented in Arizona is non-means-tested, and has been 
shown to disproportionately assist low-income students.79 The evidence indicates the 
opposite of the charges made by critics: parents from low-income economic strata in 
inner cities value school choice and leverage their ability to choose when given the 
option. State tuition tax credits can provide them that option. 
 Racial segregation is another weapon critics attempt to wield against state tuition 
tax credits, as many are presumptively skeptical of public choice options and their alleged 
impact on racial segregation. The Washington, D.C. study referenced above found that 
while both whites and African Americans cited academic program as their first reason for 
choosing Catholic schools, the percentage of African Americans ranking academic 
program first was higher than whites: 55.8% as opposed to 47.0%.80 Andrew J. Coulson 
cites two persuasive reasons that should convince critics of the value of state tuition tax 
credits in regards to racial diversity. First, “private schools have been no more of a refuge 
for opponents of integration than have suburban public schools,” and second, private 
schools have developed into institutions that are just as racially integrated as public 
schools, if not more so.81 As to the first argument, public school integration did not result 
in increased segregation in private schools. When white flight was at its highest, private 
school enrollment actually decreased by 17%, indicating that those opposed to integration 
in public schools were not using private school choice as their alternative method of 
                                            
79See Garnett, “A Winn for Educational Pluralism.” 
  
80See Convey, “Parental Choice of Catholic Schools as a Function of Religion, Race and 
Family Income.” 
 
81Coulson, Market Education, 275.  
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education.82 Furthermore, Coulson finds that income is a more accurate explanation of 
flight from urban schools than is race.83 As to the second argument, a statistical 
comparison conducted over the last forty years shows that just prior to the 1970s, 93% of 
independent school students were non-Hispanic whites, 3.6% were African Americans, 
and 3.3% were other racial or ethnic groups. The percentage of African Americans in 
independent schools nearly tripled to 9.1% thirty years later, approximating the 
proportion of African Americans in the population at large (12.6%).84 What is needed is a 
study that investigates the “extent to which minority and white students share the same 
schools and classrooms.”  
A study by James Coleman, which Coulson cites, found that by the early 1980s, 
the least integrated schools were non-Catholic independent schools followed by Catholic 
schools.85 The most racially segregated schools were public schools. This evidence 
                                            
82Ibid., 275-276. See also Gary Orfield, Must We Bus? (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1978), 59. 
 
83Ibid. 176. See also James Zafirau and Margaret Fleming, A Study of Discrepant 
Reading Achievement of Minority and White Students in a Desegregating School District: Phase 
IV (Cleveland, OH: Cleveland Public Schools, Department of Research and Analysis, 1982). 
Coulson argues that “…whites have more often had the option of fleeing to the suburbs, and a 
great many have chosen that option. So many, in fact, that Time magazine reported school 
segregation to be almost as extreme in 1996 as it was before the first mandatory busing policy 
was enacted in the early 1970s,” 138. 
 
84Ibid., citing Otto F. Kraushaar, American Non-Public Schools: Patterns of Diversity 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), 93. See also James Coleman, 
“Predicting the Consequences of Policy Changes: The Case of Public and Private Schools,” in 
Coleman, Equality and Achievement in Education (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 255-56. 
 
85Additional confirmation of the lack of racial segregation in public schools can be found 
in Greene and Mellow’s study of the level of integration in school lunchrooms cited on p. 277 of 
Coulson, Market Education. Greene and Mellow reasoned that a determination of true integration 
could be accomplished by examining voluntary lunchroom seating patterns as opposed to overall 
school enrollment figures. They found that private schools, and religious ones in particular, 
produce higher lunchroom racial integration than public schools do. See Jay P. Greene, 
“Integration Where it Counts: A Study of Racial Integration in Public and Private School 
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indicates that a state tuition tax credit program would not hinder progress made in racial 
integration in education, and instead would promote school choice and private school 
enrollment at large, the most effective way to integrate racially. The evidence also 
indicates that leaving public schools to themselves is akin to resigning future integration 
aspirations and possibly losing ground already made. 
 Lastly, critics argue that state tuition tax credit programs will cost more than 
public schools comparatively. Nevertheless, on average, independent schools cost half as 
much as average public schools.86 Furthermore, economies of scale favor private schools, 
particularly Catholic schools. Increasing enrollment has been shown to decrease tuition 
for Catholic schools, while increasing enrollment in public schools increases per-pupil 
expenditures.87 
CONCLUSION 
 The array of benefits offered by school choice options make education policy 
considerations relevant for any state. Among such competing options, state tuition tax 
credits make a persuasive case. State tuition tax credits work with free market pressures 
which enhance the education marketplace, and improve student achievement, student 
                                                                                                                                  
Lunchrooms,” paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Boston, September 
1998. 
 
86Coulson, Market Education, p. 277. While nonsectarian private school costs are more 
than public schools, Catholic and other religious schools are far cheaper. Furthermore, the 
facilities of nonsectarian private schools are typically far more opulent than typical private 
schools – see the description of the Kiski secondary school for boys in Saltsburg, Pennsylvania on 
page 278 of Market Education. While the Kiski school is outfitted with an incredible array of 
athletic facilities among other things, the cost per-pupil was barely more than public schools at 
the time. 
 
87Coulson, Market Education, p. 278, citing Robert J. Kealey, “Balance Sheet for 
Catholic Elementary Schools: 1993 Income and Expenses,” Washington, D.C., National Catholic 
Education Association, 1994, 18; also citing Allan C. Ornstein, “School Size and Effectiveness: 
Policy Implications,” Urban Review 22 (1990): 239-45.   
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graduation rates, and overall performance in education. Increased parental choice also 
demonstrates positive outcomes. Implementing a state tuition tax credit program would 
lessen the strain on state budgets and loosen the grip teachers’ unions have on 
government expenditures. Opponents of state tuition tax credits are left with little 
ammunition against urban families’ education decision-making, racial integration, and 
overall cost comparisons. Given their current popularity in 11 states, and the positive 
momentum behind the national school choice movement, the remaining 39 states should 
adopt a state tuition tax credit system. 
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